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Case No. 20160500-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLIE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, 369 P.3d 103 (Addendum A).  
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3) 
(West Supp. 2016). 
INTRODUCTION 
 Fifty years ago, Miranda v. Arizona required police to warn a person 
they are about to question that (1) the person has the right not to talk to 
them, and (2) if he does talk to them, anything he says can and will be used 
against him in court.  Since then, Miranda warnings have “become so 
embedded in routine police practice [that they] have become part of our 
national culture.”  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).   But 
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despite the universal understanding that anything a person says to police 
will be used against him in court, the court of appeals has now held that 
many things a person says to police actually cannot be used against him in 
court. And this is true, the court of appeals concluded, even when the 
statements conflict with the defendant’s trial testimony. 
 Under Doyle v. Ohio, a person who chooses to exercise his right not to 
talk to police cannot have his silence used to impeach his testimony at trial.  
According to the court of appeals, silence includes statements about the 
interrogation rather than about the crime. 
Here, Defendant did not choose to exercise his right not to talk to 
police when they tried to question him about a shooting that had happened 
only moments before they arrested him.  Instead, he demanded to know 
why police were questioning him, claimed that the police had awakened 
him, and professed to be unaware that the shooting had happened.  Then at 
trial, he admitted that he knew about the shooting, but claimed the victim 
was shot accidentally after he pulled his gun in self-defense.  The State used 
his post-Miranda protestations of ignorance of any shooting at all to impeach 
his trial admission to a shooting done while he was acting in self-defense.  
The court of appeals held this was error, reasoning that the statements were 
the same as silence because, in its estimation, they were statements about 
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the interrogation, rather than indisputably admissible statements about the 
crime itself.  This holding depends on a distinction—actual statements and 
silence-equivalent statements—that Doyle itself does not draw.  And even 
though the court of appeals affirmed on harmlessness grounds, its 
reasoning denies the State access to impeachment evidence that no 
constitutional rule prohibits using—post-Miranda denials to police that 
cannot be squared with an explanation offered at trial.   
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 This Court granted review on the following question: 
 “Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the prosecutor 
improperly commented on Respondent[’]s failure to assert self-defense 
during an interview with police.” 
 Standard of Review.  This Court reviews the court of appeals’ decision 
for correctness.  See Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶6, 358 P.3d 1067.   
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum C:  
 U.S. Const. amend. V 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts.1 
 After a long night of drinking, Defendant shot his friend John.  See 
R.297:28-29, 132; R.298:7, 36, State’s Ex. 1.  John had been visiting his Aunt 
Jody and Uncle Tim at their home, where Defendant also rented a room.  See 
R.297:14-16, 64-65; R.298:31, 36.   
 John had arrived at their home late one morning for an extended visit.  
See R.297:16.  When Defendant arrived home later that evening, John and 
Tim were playing cribbage.  See R.297:18-19, 74.  They all “exchanged some 
pleasantries” and Defendant sat down with them. R.297:17-19; R.298:40.  
Defendant drank beer and John drank whiskey while they visited.  See id.      
 “[A]ll of a sudden,” Defendant got “an attitude” and called Jody a 
“cunt.”  R.297:19-20, 76, 82, 88.  John was “shocked” and told Defendant to 
apologize.  R.297:20, 82, 89.  Tim told Defendant he could not speak that 
way to Jody.  See R.297:20, 82.  But things soon “calmed down” and John 
and Tim finished their cribbage game.  R.297:21, 83.  Afterwards, Tim and 
Jody went to bed.  R.297:21.  John and Defendant stayed up, playing poker 
and “taking shots” of whiskey.  R.297:21, 78-79.   
                                              
1 Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light 
most favorable to the jury’s verdict and conflicting evidence is presented 
only as needed to understand the issues raised on appeal.  See State v. 
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ¶2, 6 P.3d 1116. 
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 At one point, John and Defendant “got in a little argument over what 
[Defendant] had called” Jody.  R.297:22.  John told Defendant that he had 
“disrespect[ed]” his family, but Defendant answered that “it was just how 
he felt . . . and he was not going to apologize.”  R.297:22, 76-77.  The 
argument woke Tim, who came out of his bedroom and told them to be 
quiet.  See R.297:23.  John and Defendant “quieted down” and continued to 
play poker.  Id. 
 Defendant later invited John into his bedroom for a “shot of brandy.”  
R.297:22.  They talked about golf as John followed Defendant to his room.  
See id.  As they reached the foot of Defendant’s bed, John asked if they were 
going golfing in the morning.  See R.297:23-24.  Defendant turned around 
and answered, “How about I just fuckin’ kill you?”  Id.  Defendant had a 
gun in his hand.  See R.297:24.  With his finger on the trigger, Defendant 
“[p]ulled back the hammer, raised it up and pointed it in [John’s] face.”  
R.297:24.  Not wanting “to get shot,” John grabbed Defendant’s wrist with 
one hand and “the barrel of the gun” with the other and “tried to pull it 
away.”  R.297:24, 27.  The gun, however, “went off.”  R.297:27.  The bullet 
hit John below his ribcage and exited out his back.  See R.297:27-29; State’s 
Ex. 1.  Fearing that Defendant would shoot him again, John held onto the 
gun and Defendant’s wrist while trying to pull the gun free from 
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Defendant’s hands.  See R.297:29.  Defendant fell back onto his bed.  See id.  
John put one knee on Defendant’s wrist and “screamed for help.”  Id.    
 Awakened by the gunshot, Tim and Jody ran to Defendant’s 
bedroom.  See R.297:68-69, 80, 90.  Tim saw Defendant lying on his bed, 
holding a gun with his finger on the trigger.  See R.297:69-70.  John stood 
over Defendant with one foot on the floor and his other knee on 
Defendant’s wrist.  See R.297:69-70, 80.  John was holding the barrel of the 
gun with one hand and Defendant’s wrist with the other.  See R.297:69-70.   
 John told his aunt and uncle that he had been shot.  See R.297:70, 81, 
91.  Tim “rushed” Jody “out of the room” and called 911.  R.297:71.  Soon 
after, Tim informed John and Defendant—who were still struggling over 
the gun—that the police had arrived and were outside.  See R.297:30; 
R.298:50-51.  To persuade Defendant to let go of the gun, John told 
Defendant that he would go outside and tell the police that the shooting 
was an accident.  See R.297:30; R.298:51.  Defendant surrendered the gun 
and John carried it outside to the waiting police.  See R.297:30, 49.  An 
ambulance took John to the hospital where he was treated and later 
released.  See R.297:31, 42.   
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 At the hospital, John told the investigating officer, Detective Arnn, 
that Defendant had pointed a gun at him and said something like “I’m just 
going to kill you” or “I should kill you now.”  R.297:46-47, 117.       
Defendant’s police interview:  “You woke me up” 2 
 After John walked outside to the waiting police, Defendant changed 
his clothes.  See R.298:51.  He then walked outside.  See R.298:51-52.  The 
police immediately arrested Defendant and took him to the police station 
for questioning.  R.298:54.  Once in an interview room, the interviewing 
officer, Detective Arnn, observed that Defendant smelled “very strong[ly]” 
of alcohol.  R.297:131.  He offered Defendant a Coke. See R.297:131; R.298:64.  
Defendant responded that he wanted “a rum and Coke,” then a “six pack 
and a cigarette.”  R.298:64.  And Defendant asked the police officers 
whether they thought they could “all handle” him.  R.298:54, 63-64.   
  Defendant told Detective Arnn, “Still don’t understand why I’m here. 
What happened?” R.298:64.  When Detective Arnn explained that 
Defendant was under arrest, Defendant asked, “for what?” and then asked 
repeatedly why he was there. R.298:64-65.  In response, Detective Arnn read 
Defendant his Miranda rights, but Defendant replied that he did not 
                                              
2  A transcript of Defendant’s police interview is not in the record on 
appeal.  This account is taken from Defendant’s testimony at trial.  See 
R.298:56, 63-66, 70.   
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understand his rights.  See R.298:65.  Detective Arnn asked him what part of 
his rights he did not understand and Defendant retorted, “The part where 
you’re fucking jerking me off.  What the fuck am I doing here to begin with?  
You people woke me up.”  Id.  He continued, “I want to know what the fuck 
I am doing here. . . .”  Id.  Detective Arnn told Defendant that he was under 
arrest for attempted murder and Defendant asked, “To who?”  R.298:70. In 
answer, Detective Arnn explained that someone had been shot.  See 
R.298:65, 70.   Defendant responded, “Whose [sic] got a gunshot wound?” 
Id. Defendant continued, “I want to know what the fuck is going on . . . .  
You woke me up.  I want to know what is going on.”  R.298:65.  Detective 
Arnn eventually stopped the interview.  See R.297:1.  
Defendant’s phone calls from jail: 
Changing the “game plan” to self-defense 
 
 While in jail awaiting trial, Defendant made several phone calls.  He 
first called Tim, asking him to tell him “what happened” because Defendant 
did not “remember anything” and the police had told him he shot Tim.  
R.298:24, 55-56.  Later, Defendant called his mother.  R.298:58.  He told her 
that he needed John “to say this was an accident.”  Id.  A day later, he 
assured his mother that John would be a “team player” and “say this was an 
accident.”  R.298:58:25, 58. 
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 Defendant later called a friend, Christy. R.298:59, 66-67. When Christy 
told Defendant that John was “unwilling to say this was an accident,” 
Defendant asked her to “[t]alk to him again,” “be pushy,” and tell him that 
they would “take care of him” and make it “well worth his while” if he told 
police that the shooting was an accident.  Id.   
 But Defendant later told his mother in another call that he would 
“have to change the game plan” and was “[g]oing a different direction with 
the story, [it’s] self-defense now since John . . . doesn’t want to play ball.”  
R.298:25, 59-60.  
B. Summary of proceedings. 
 Defendant was charged with felony discharge of a firearm with 
injury, a second degree felony, and aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony.  See R.46-47.   
Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of his police interview 
 The morning of trial, defense counsel orally moved to exclude 
“anything in regard to” Defendant’s police interview.  R.297:8, 1.  Defense 
counsel argued that Defendant had not cooperated in the interview and 
“stated numerous times that he didn’t understand his Miranda rights and 
finally the State gave up and did not question any further.”  R.297:1.  
 The State represented that it would not “go into the content” of 
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Defendant’s interview, but wanted the detective to testify about 
Defendant’s behavior so that the jury could “understand that the defendant 
was inebriated” like John.  R.297:2, 9.  When the trial court stated that 
“behavioral descriptions” “should be acceptable,” defense counsel further 
objected that Defendant’s “belligerent” attitude was not relevant.  R.298:2, 9.  
The State clarified that it would ask the officer only “[v]ery general” 
questions about Defendant’s intoxication and not “paint the defendant as a 
jerk.”  See R.297:10.  The court stated, “I think that addresses [defense 
counsel]’s concerns.  Is that correct?”  R.297:11.  Defense counsel answered, 
“it will.”  Id.   
The State’s case 
 The State called John, Tim, Jody, and Detective Arnn to testify at trial.  
See R.297. The State also played excerpts of the jail house phone calls.  
R.298:21-26.3  The jury heard that Defendant called Tim, asking him to tell 
him “what happened” because Defendant did not “remember anything” 
and the police had told him he shot Tim.  R.298:55-56.  They also heard 
Defendant telling his mother that he believed John would be a “team 
                                              
3 The phone calls were not transcribed and the recordings were not 
transported with the rest of the record on appeal.  See supplemental index; 
R.135.  The prosecutor, however, summarized some portions of the phone 
calls on the record and Defendant also testified to what he said in the calls.  
See R.298:21-26, 55-60, 66-67. 
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player” and “say this was an accident.”  R.298:58:25, 58.  They then heard 
Defendant’s ask Christy to talk with John, “be pushy,” and tell him that 
they would “take care of him” and make it “well worth his while” if he told 
police that the shooting was an accident.  R.298:59, 66-67.  And finally, they 
head Defendant telling his mother that they would “have to change the 
game plan” and go “a different direction with the story, [it’s] self-defense 
now since John . . . doesn’t want to play ball.”  R.298:25, 59-60. 
 Detective Arnn testified about his interviews with Defendant and 
John.  See R.297:104-152.  True to his word, the prosecutor did not ask 
Detective Arnn about the content of Defendant’s interview or about 
Defendant’s attitude; he asked only about Defendant’s drunken demeanor.  
See R.297:130-132.  And Detective Arnn testified only that Defendant 
appeared drunk and that Defendant acted “more inebriated” than John.  
R.297:132. 
 When defense counsel cross-examined Detective Arnn, he asked 
whether Defendant was “a little mad,” “[b]elligerent,” and not “very 
cooperative” in the interview.  R.297:138-139.  Detective Arnn answered yes 
to each question.  Id.  
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Defendant’s defense:  Self-defense 
 Defendant testified.  See R.298:31-70.  He claimed that he had pulled 
out his gun in self-defense and that John had pulled the trigger himself 
when he grabbed the gun and fell on top of him.  See id.   
 According to Defendant, after he called Jody a “fat fucking cunt,” 
John told him to apologize.  R.298:43-44.  Defendant refused and went to his 
room.  R.298:44.  He claimed that he was sitting on his bed when John came 
in uninvited, stepped “on top” of Defendant’s feet, put both of his fists 
“up,” and stood “over the top” of Defendant.  R.298:44-45.  John told 
Defendant, “you’re going to apologize to my aunt.”  R.298:45.  Feeling 
“threatened,” Defendant grabbed his loaded gun from under his pillow, 
pointed it at John, and told him, “you need to get out of my room.”  
R.298:45-46. 
 Defendant testified that John, however, grabbed the gun, pinning 
Defendant’s finger against the gun frame.  See R.298:46.  John then lost his 
balance, fell on top of Defendant, and John’s finger “pushed the trigger and 
fired the weapon.”  Id.   
 After John was shot, Defendant did not let go of the gun for fear that 
John would “turn around and use it” on him.  R.298:50.  But Defendant 
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relinquished the weapon when John told him that he would go outside and 
tell the waiting police that the shooting was an accident.  See R.298:51. 
 Defendant also gave an explanation for his phone calls from jail.  He 
asserted that he had lied to Tim about not remembering the shooting simply 
because he wanted to “find out what’s going on on his end.”  R.298:56.  And 
he explained that he talked to Christy about compensating John because 
Christy had told him that John did not want to “press charges” and “just 
wanted to [be] compensated for the days off that he missed from work.”  
R.298:59-60.   
 While explaining his phone call with Tim on direct examination, 
Defendant testified that the police had tried to read him his Miranda rights 
and ask him what happened, but he told them, “I’m not telling you 
anything.”  R.298:56.  His counsel also asked him whether he was 
“belligerent” and “uncooperative” at his police interview.  R.298:54, 64.  
Defendant agreed that he had been.  See id.   
 On cross-examination, the prosecutor stated that he wanted to “round 
off” Defendant’s testimony about being “belligerent” during his police 
interview.  R.298:63.  The prosecutor asked Defendant about his requests for 
rum and Coke, a six pack, and cigarettes.  R.298:64. He asked Defendant 
about his taunting officers with whether they could “all handle” him.  
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R.298:54, 63-64.  And he asked Defendant whether he demanded to know 
why police were questioning him, claimed that the police had awakened 
him, and professed to be unaware that the shooting happened.  R.298:65, 70.  
Defendant admitted that he had made all those statements, including “I 
want to know what’s going on,” “You people woke me up,” “Whose [sic] 
got a gunshot wound?” and “To who?” in response to being informed that 
he was under arrest for attempted murder.  See R.298:54, 63-65, 70.  Defense 
counsel did not object to any of the questions.  See id. 
 Defendant called other witnesses to testify on his behalf.  His mother 
testified that John had told her the shooting was an accident.  See R.298:75, 
77, 79.  Defendant’s mother’s friend testified that she overheard John say the 
shooting was an accident over the phone.  R.298:76, 80-81.  And a physician 
testified as an expert that John’s blood alcohol level was high enough to 
impair one’s ability “[t]o think, to understand, to remember” and “walk in a 
straight line.”  R.298:8.        
Closing arguments  
 In closing, the prosecutor explained how the evidence met the 
elements of the crimes of discharge of a firearm with injury and aggravated 
assault.  He also argued that Defendant had not acted in self-defense:  “He 
brought the gun to what had been a word fight.”  R.298:96-97.     
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 In Defendant’s closing, defense counsel argued that Defendant had 
pulled his gun in self-defense and that John “discharged” the gun when he 
tried to take it.  R.298:107-113.  He further argued that the jail house phone 
calls were consistent with the defense theory and that Defendant merely 
had been willing to compensate John for his lost wages.  R.298:112.  
 Defense counsel also argued that Defendant was “belligerent” and 
“uncooperative” at his police interview because he was “an innocent man,” 
and that his behavior “cause[d] [Detective Arnn] to be not very pleasant 
when he comes to testify.”  R.298:111. 
 On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that Defendant’s self-defense 
theory was not believable because his story had evolved:  first, he claimed to 
the police and to John’s uncle that he did not know what happened; then he 
asked his friend to push John into saying that it was an accident; and when 
that did not work, he finally claimed that he acted in self-defense.  
R.298:119-120.  The prosecutor explained that Defendant told the police in 
his interview not that he acted in self-defense, or even that it was an 
accident, but that he did not know that anything had happened: 
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when they 
questioned him, what does he say?  Why am I here?  Why are 
you jerking me off?  Nothing happened.  You woke me up.  
You woke me up.  He didn’t say it was an accident.  He doesn’t 
say this was self-defense. 
-16- 
R.298:120.   
 Defendant immediately objected and moved for a mistrial:  “That is a 
comment on my client’s right to remain silent and I move for a mistrial.”  
R.298:121.  The trial court denied the motion, ruling that it was not a 
comment on Defendant’s right to remain silent, and even if it were, it did 
not influence the jury to Defendant’s prejudice.  R.298:123-124, R.178. 
 The jury ultimately convicted Defendant of aggravated assault, but 
found him not guilty of discharge of a firearm with injury.  See R.135, 138; 
R.298:128.   
 Defendant timely appealed.  R.264. 
The court of appeals’ decision 
 On appeal, Defendant argued in part that the prosecutor’s closing 
argument impermissibly used his silence as evidence of guilt, violating his 
right against self-incrimination.  State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶13, 369 
P.3d 103.  The court of appeals agreed, holding that the prosecutor 
impermissibly commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right to remain 
silent when he pointed out in closing argument that Defendant had not told 
the police that he acted in self-defense, as he had testified at trial.  See id. at 
¶26.   
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 Although the court of appeals recognized that Defendant “did not 
remain silent in the usual sense”—for Defendant “in fact made statements 
to police”—it nonetheless treated Defendant’s statements as “the equivalent 
of silence.”  Id. at ¶¶13 n.3, 21-22, 29.   This was because the court of appeals 
believed that “controlling case law treats commenting on the suspect’s 
statements about the interrogation—as opposed to statements about the 
crime—as tantamount to commenting on the suspect’s silence.”  Id. at ¶13 
n.3.  
 The court of appeals relied on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and 
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam).  It noted that although 
the Doyle decision prohibited the use of a defendant’s post-Miranda 
“silence,” two footnotes in the opinion revealed that one of the two 
defendants in the case made two statements to police after arrest:  either “I 
don’t know what you are talking about” or “What’s this all about?” and 
“you got to be crazy.”  McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶17 (quoting Doyle, 426 
U.S. at 614-615 n.5 & 622 n.4 (Stevens, J. dissenting)).   
 And in Charles, the United States Supreme Court recognized—again 
in a footnote—that Doyle “‘analyzed the due process question as if both 
defendants had remained silent.’”  McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶20 (quoting 
Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 n.2).  
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 Relying on these two footnotes, the court of appeals declined to take 
Doyle at its word—that it prohibits using a defendant’s post-Miranda 
silence—and concluded that “[w]hat matters,” is not whether the defendant 
is silent, but whether his post-Miranda statements are “‘about [a 
defendant’s] involvement in the crime.’”  Id. (quoting Charles, 447 U.S. at 
407) (second alteration in original).  The court read Charles to hold that post-
arrest statements about the suspect’s involvement in the interrogation 
itself—such as ‘What’s this all about?’ ‘You got to be crazy,’ and ‘I don’t 
know what you are talking about’—are for Doyle purposes, the equivalent 
of silence.”  Id. at ¶21. 
 Applying this principle, the court of appeals determined that 
Defendant’s statements—namely “‘Why are you jerking me [around]?’”  
“‘Nothing happened,’” and “‘You woke me up’”—although “more 
bellicose,” were similar to those in Doyle and accordingly were statements 
about his interrogation, not about the crime.  Id. at ¶22 (addition in 
original). The court of appeals thus proceeded “as if [Defendant] had 
remained silent” and held that the prosecutor violated the Doyle 
proscription when he referred to Defendant’s statements in his closing 
argument.  Id. at ¶¶22, 26, 29. 
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 Although the court of appeals found constitutional error, it 
nonetheless affirmed Defendant’s conviction because the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where evidence of Defendant’s 
evolving story—independent of his statements to police—was 
overwhelming, Defendant’s own testimony supported his aggravated 
assault conviction, and the prosecutor’s comment was an “isolated 
reference”—roughly four lines of transcript.  Id. at ¶33-36, 38. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The court of appeals erred when it held that the prosecutor 
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right to 
remain silent because Defendant’s post-Miranda statements “about his 
involvement in the interrogation” were equivalent to silence under Doyle v. 
Ohio and Anderson v. Charles.  Neither Doyle nor Charles supports treating 
Defendant’s statements as the equivalent of silence.  First, Doyle and Charles 
did not distinguish between a defendant’s statements about the 
interrogation and a defendant’s statements about the crime.  Rather, the 
controlling distinction between what Doyle permits and what it prohibits is 
whether the prosecutor’s questions were “designed to draw meaning from 
silence,” or “to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.”  
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Where the prosecutor elicits an explanation for a prior inconsistent 
statement, there is no Doyle violation.  That is what the prosecutor did here. 
 When police questioned Defendant about the shooting, he protested 
his factual innocence by pretending to know nothing about it.  By the time 
of trial, he protested his legal innocence by admitting to the shooting he told 
police he knew nothing about, but giving the jury a legally exonerating 
explanation for it.  The two stories cannot be squared with each other, and 
the prosecutor properly informed the jury of the conflict. 
 But even if Doyle or Charles arguably created a distinction between 
statements about the interrogation or statements about the crime, the court 
of appeals still erred because Defendant’s statements here were not about 
the interrogation.  They were instead statements about the crime that 
conflicted with the version he gave at trial.  Defendant’s statements told an 
exculpatory story that he was not involved in the crime:  he had been 
asleep, he was awakened by the police, and he did not know that anyone 
had been shot.  By prohibiting the State from inquiring into statements like 
Defendant’s, the court of appeals has denied the jury access to information 
important to assessing whether a defendant’s testimony is true.  This Court 
should reverse.   
-21- 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONESOULY HELD THAT 
DEFENDANT’S INCONSISTENT, POST-MIRANDA 
STATEMENTS WERE EQUIVALENT TO SILENCE UNDER 
DOYLE V. OHIO AND ANDERSON V. CHARLES 
 The court of appeals erred when it held that the prosecutor 
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right to 
remain silent under Doyle v. Ohio. 
 When a defendant exercises his right not to talk to police, then 
testifies to an exculpatory version of events at trial, Doyle v. Ohio and 
Anderson v. Charles prohibit the State from arguing that the jury should not 
believe the defendant’s testimony on the basis that he withheld that version 
from police when he refused to talk to them. 
 But Defendant did not remain silent after Miranda warnings.  Instead, 
he told police that he had been asleep at the time of the shooting and did 
not know that anyone had been shot.  See R.298:63-65, 70.  These statements 
conflicted with his trial testimony that he was awake and knew that John 
had been shot in a struggle that resulted when Defendant merely tried to 
defend himself. 
 Even though the prosecutor did not rely on Defendant’s post-
Miranda silence, the court of appeals held that the prosecutor 
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right to 
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remain silent.  To get there, the court of appeals recognized a different kind 
of post-Miranda “silence”—post-Miranda silence-equivalent statements.  It 
concluded that post-Miranda statements about the interrogation are the 
same as silence and Doyle and Charles prohibited using those statements to 
impeach Defendant’s inconsistent trial testimony. 
 Neither Doyle v. Ohio nor Anderson v. Charles support treating 
Defendant’s statements as the equivalent of silence.  First, Doyle and Charles 
did not distinguish between a defendant’s statements about the 
interrogation and a defendant’s statements about the crime, or otherwise 
characterize statements about the interrogation as the equivalent of silence 
that the State may not use.  Second, even if Doyle or Charles arguably did so, 
the court of appeals still erred because Defendant’s statements here were 
not about the interrogation; they were instead statements about the crime 
that conflicted with the version he gave at trial.  By prohibiting the State 
from inquiring into statements like Defendant’s, the court of appeals has 
denied the jury access to information important to assessing whether a 
defendant’s testimony is true.    
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A. Doyle v. Ohio and Anderson v. Charles did not create a 
category of silence-equivalent statements that the State 
cannot use at trial. 
 Neither Doyle v. Ohio nor Anderson v. Charles support the proposition 
that a defendant’s statements are to be treated as silence when they concern 
the interrogation and not the crime.  Rather, both cases support the long-
standing understanding that a prosecutor may impeach a defendant with 
his post-Miranda statements that conflict with his trial testimony. 
 The Fifth Amendment to the Utah States Constitution provides that 
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself. . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  In Miranda v. Arizona, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires “a 
person taken into custody be advised immediately that he has the right to 
be silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he has the 
right to retained or appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation.”  
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).  Implicit in Miranda’s warning is the 
assurance that if a person invokes his right to remain silent, his “silence will 
carry no penalty.”  Id. at 618.  Thus, in Doyle v. Ohio, the United States 
Supreme Court held that “the use for impeachment purposes of [a 
defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda 
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warnings, violate[s] the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
Id. at 619.   
 Doyle based its holding on two grounds.  First, as stated, it was 
“fundamentally unfair” to use a defendant’s post-Miranda silence when the 
warning implicitly assured him that “silence will carry no penalty.”  Id. at 
618.  Second, silence is not necessarily inconsistent with later trial testimony.  
Id. at 617.  Indeed, post-Miranda silence is “insolubly ambiguous” because it 
“may be nothing more than . . . [an] exercise of these Miranda rights.”  Id.   
 The petitioners in Doyle, Doyle and Wood, had been charged with 
selling marijuana to an informant.  Id. at 611.  They were arrested near the 
scene of the transaction and given Miranda warnings by the arresting officer.  
Id. at 612.  They were tried separately and each testified at both trials that 
they were actually attempting to buy marijuana and that the informant had 
framed them.  Id. at 612-613.   
 During cross-examination of each petitioner, the prosecutor 
repeatedly asked why they had not told the frame-up story to the arresting 
officer:  if “you are innocent . . . why didn’t you tell him?”  Id. at 613-614.  
And in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the petitioners’ post-
arrest silence showed they were guilty:  “if you are innocent . . . You tell the 
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truth.  You tell them what happened. . . .”  Id. at 633-634 n.12 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
 The Doyle opinion characterized petitioners Doyle and Wood as 
remaining silent after arrest.  Id. at 613, 616 (framing issue as “use of a 
defendant’s post-arrest silence” and quoting cross-examination of Wood 
who testified that he did not tell arresting officer anything).  But a footnote 
in the majority’s opinion shows that one of the petitioners, Doyle, made one 
statement at arrest.  Id. at 614 n.5.  At his trial, Doyle testified that he said 
only “‘What’s this all about?’” when arrested.  Id.  He denied making the 
statement, “‘I don’t know what you are talking about.’” Id.  A footnote in 
the dissenting opinion also shows that at Wood’s trial, Doyle testified that 
he made two statements at arrest, “What the hell is all this about” and “you 
got to be crazy.”  Id. at 622 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Wood remained 
silent.  See id.; Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407 n.2 (1980) (per curiam). 
 But the Doyle Court never directly acknowledged that Doyle made 
one or two statements at arrest.  See generally, Doyle, 426 U.S. 610.  It did not 
consider whether Doyle’s statement(s) were “the equivalent of silence.”  
McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶21.  And it did not distinguish between 
statements made about an interrogation and statements made about the 
facts of the crime.  See generally, Doyle, 426 U.S. 610.   
-26- 
 In Anderson v. Charles, the United States Supreme Court made clear 
that Doyle does not prohibit a prosecutor from impeaching a defendant with 
his post-Miranda statements when they are inconsistent with his trial 
testimony.  447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam).  This is true even if the 
prosecutor’s questioning “concerned the respondent’s failure to tell the 
police the story he recounted at trial.”   Id. at 408.   
 Charles was arrested while driving a stolen car that belonged to a 
murder victim.  Id. at 404.  After receiving Miranda warnings, Charles told 
police that he stole the car from a certain street.  Id. at 405, 408-409.  But at 
trial he testified that he stole the car from a parking lot at a location two 
miles distant from this street. Id. The prosecutor cross-examined Charles 
about this inconsistency, asking him, “Don’t you think it’s rather odd that if 
it were the truth that you didn’t come forward and tell anybody at the time 
you were arrested, where you got that car?”  Id. at 406. 
 The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s questioning was not a 
Doyle violation.  “Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely 
inquires into prior inconsistent statements.”  Id. at 408.  And although the 
“two inconsistent descriptions of events may be said to involve ‘silence’ 
insofar as it omits facts included in the other version . . . Doyle does not 
require any such formulistic understanding of ‘silence.’”  Id. at 409.   
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 The Charles court explained that the underpinnings of the Doyle 
decision did not apply in that situation.  First, “[s]uch questioning makes no 
unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after 
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.  As to 
the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent 
at all.”  Id. at 408 (citing with approval United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 
354-356 (3rd Cir. 1979) (en banc) (explaining “Doyle can have no application 
to a case in which the defendant did not exercise his right to remain silent”; 
for “to hold that a prosecutor may not question or refer to a defendant’s 
statements and conduct which were designed to deceive the police 
regarding the commission of a crime, we would be extending the holding of 
Doyle far beyond its rationale”).  Compare Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618 (explaining 
it is “fundamentally unfair” to use a defendant’s post-Miranda silence when 
the warning implicitly assured him that “silence will carry no penalty”). 
 Second, the questions “were not designed to draw meaning from 
silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.”  
Charles, 447 U.S. at 409.  Compare Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 (explaining post-
Miranda silence is not necessarily inconsistent with trial testimony because it 
“may be nothing more than . . . [an] exercise of these Miranda rights”).   See 
also People v. McReavy, 462 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Mich. 1990)  (explaining that if 
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defendant is silent “there is an irrebuttable presumption of irrelevancy, and 
such silence may not be used substantively or for impeachment purposes 
since there is no way to know after the fact whether it was due to the 
exercise of constitutional rights or to guilty knowledge . . . [but w]here the 
defendant has not maintained ‘silence,’ but has chosen to speak, the Court 
has refused to endorse a formalistic view of silence”).   
  In its discussion of Doyle, Charles described the case as one that 
“involved two defendants who made no postarrest statements about their 
involvement in the crime.”  Charles, 447 U.S. at 407.  In a footnote, Charles 
recognized that Doyle actually made two statements at arrest, but that both 
the Doyle majority and dissent “analyzed the due process question as if both 
defendants had remained silent.  The issue was said to involve cross-
examination of a person who ‘does remain silent.’”  Id. at 407 n.2 (quoting 
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 620) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  Charles did not otherwise 
examine or address why Doyle characterized the petitioners as remaining 
silent, but observed that “[i]n any event, neither” of Doyle’s statements 
“contradicted the defendant’s later trial testimony.”  Id.   
 Like Doyle, Charles did not consider whether Charles’s statements 
could be “the equivalent of silence.”  McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶21.  It also 
did not distinguish between statements made about an interrogation and 
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statements made about the facts of the crime.  See generally, Charles, 447 U.S. 
404.  And while Charles noted that Doyle did not make any statements about 
his “involvement in the crime,” it also observed that Doyle’s statements did 
not contradict his trial testimony in any way.  Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 & n.2.  
In other words, Doyle’s post-Miranda statements were not prior inconsistent 
statements that could be used to impeach his trial testimony.  See Grunewald 
v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418 (1957) (“It is, of course, an elementary rule 
of evidence that prior statements may be used to impeach the credibility of 
a criminal defendant . . . [b]ut this can be done only if the judge is satisfied 
that the prior statements are in fact inconsistent.”); United States v. Hale, 422 
U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (“A basic rule of evidence provides that prior 
inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of a 
witness.”).  See also Reynolds v. State, 114 So.3d 61, 134 (Ala. App. 2010) 
(hypothesizing that Doyle’s statements were “construed to be silence for the 
purposes of analysis, presumably because it did not actually contradict 
Doyle’s trial testimony”) (citing Charles, 447 U.S. at 408 n. 2).   
 Thus, the controlling distinction between what Doyle permits and 
what it prohibits is not whether a defendant’s statements are about his 
involvement in the crime or about the interrogations itself, as the court of 
appeals declared, McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶20.  Rather, the controlling 
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distinction is whether the prosecutor’s questions were “designed to draw 
meaning from silence,” or “to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent 
statement.” Charles, 447 U.S. at 409.  See also State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 315 
(Utah 1985), abandoned on other grounds as stated in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986), (explaining that to constitute an impermissible comment on a 
defendant’s silence, the remark must be “‘manifestly intended or . . . of such 
character that a jury would naturally and necessarily construe it to amount 
to a comment on defendant’s silence’”); United States v. Cantebury, 985 F.2d 
483, 486 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining Doyle violation “turns on whether the 
cross-examination was designed to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony 
by calling attention to prior inconsistent statements or, instead, was 
designed to suggest an inference of guilt from the defendant’s post-arrest 
silence.”); Greico v. Hall, 641 F.2d 1029, 1034 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[O]nce a 
defendant makes post-arrest statements that may arguably be inconsistent 
with the trial story, inquiry into what was not said at arrest may be 
designed not ‘to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for 
a prior inconsistent statement.’”) (quoting Charles, 447 U.S. at 409); United 
States v. Caruto, 532 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that there is no 
Doyle violation where “differences between the post-arrest statement and 
the trial testimony [are] ‘arguably inconsistent’”).  And where the 
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prosecutor elicits an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement, there is 
no Doyle violation.  Charles, 447 U.S. at 408-409.  See also State v. Velarde, 675 
P.2d 1194, 1195 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (“The inconsistency of that 
testimony with what defendant had told the officer is a legitimate basis for a 
prosecutor’s testing the credibility of a witness by way of impeachment.”). 
 Here, there can be no doubt that the prosecutor did only what Doyle 
permits:  confront Defendant with his prior inconsistent statements.  When 
police questioned Defendant about the shooting, he protested his factual 
innocence by pretending to know nothing about it.  See R.298:63-35, 70.  As 
time showed him that that strategy would likely fail, he changed course.  By 
the time of trial, he protested his legal innocence by admitting to the 
shooting he told police he knew nothing about, but giving the jury a legally 
exonerating explanation for it.  See R.298:44-46.  The two stories cannot be 
squared with each other, and the prosecutor properly informed the jury of 
the conflict: 
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when they 
questioned him, what does he say?  Why am I here?  Why are 
you jerking me off?  Nothing happened.  You woke me up.  
You woke me up.  He didn’t say it was an accident.  He doesn’t 
say this was self-defense [like he did at trial]. 
R.298:120.   
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 The prosecutor’s cross-examination and closing argument were thus 
not designed to suggest that Defendant was guilty because he was silent at 
arrest.  Rather, the prosecutor’s argument was designed, like in Charles, “to 
elicit an explanation” for his inconsistent stories.  Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. By 
pointing out that Defendant’s story had “evolved,” the prosecutor made no 
use of Defendant’s silence.  R.298:120. 
 Likewise, the two bases of the Doyle decision do not apply here.  First, 
the prosecutor’s argument made “no unfair use of silence because a 
defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not 
been induced to remain silent.”  Charles, 447 U.S. at 408.  “As to the subject 
matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.”  Id.  
Second, Defendant’s statements were not “insolubly ambiguous”; they were 
patently inconsistent with his trial version of events.   Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.  
See also State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1097–98, 1100 (Conn. 2010) (explaining 
that “Once an arrestee has waived his right to remain silent, the Doyle 
rationale is not operative because the arrestee has not remained silent and 
an explanatory statement assuredly is no longer ‘insolubly ambiguous.’ By 
speaking, the defendant has chosen unambiguously not to assert his right to 
remain silent. He knows that anything he says can and will be used against 
him”). 
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 Thus, contrary to the court of appeals’ reading, neither Doyle nor 
Charles understood that the silence that the State cannot inquire into 
includes statements about the interrogation.  They only prohibit drawing an 
unfair inference from the defendant’s exercise of a right he has just been 
informed he has the right to exercise.  See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787-
788 (Utah App. 1991) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor pointed 
out that Harrison did not tell police that murder victim was armed like he 
did at trial when claiming self-defense); Velarde, 675 P.2d at 1195-1196 
(holding that prosecutor properly impeached Velarde’s trial testimony that 
he remembered how he arrived in Morgan with statement to police that he 
did not know he was in Morgan); United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez, 676 F.2d 
1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that prosecutor’s questions about details 
defendant omitted in interrogation not Doyle violation because prosecutor 
was not “attempting to draw meaning from the defendant’s silence”); 
United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding no Doyle 
violation where prosecutor argued in closing that “[n]ever once did” May 
tell the story that he told at trial because “focus of the prosecutor’s 
comments was not on May’s failure to present his exculpatory story at the 
time of arrest, but on prior inconsistent stories as in Anderson v. Charles”); 
Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that cross-
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examination “was within permissible limits because [defendant] presented 
a new story at trial that was materially different from the information he 
provided police”).   
 The court of appeals’ classification of statements about the 
interrogation as opposed to statements about the crime is problematic for 
other reasons as well.  In most cases, a defendant’s statements about his 
interrogation would likely not be admissible at trial simply because they 
would not be relevant.  But there may be cases where a defendant’s 
statements—although not about the crime—would be relevant and 
necessary at trial.  For example, where a defendant raised an insanity 
defense, but he coherently speaks during the interrogation, his statements 
could be used at trial to rebut his defense.  See Commonwealth v. Hunsberger, 
565 A.2d 152, 153-155 (Penn. 1989) (finding no Doyle violation where State 
introduced defendant’s questions, “Are public defenders as good as money 
lawyers?” and “How can I get to see the public defender on the sixth floor 
of the courthouse if I am in jail?” to rebut insanity defense).  And where a 
defendant is charged with DUI, his statements about the interrogation could 
be relevant to show his intoxication.  See State v. Lee, 967 A.2d 1161, 1164-
1166 (Vt. 2008) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor showed Lee’s 
police interview of him drunkenly yelling obscenities while officer read 
-35- 
Miranda rights, then was silent; “The State did not offer the tape to show 
defendant was guilty because he refused to speak with the officer.”).  
Likewise, where a defendant raises an intoxication defense, his statements 
about the interrogation would be relevant to rebut his defense.  See Shaw v. 
State, 2014 WL 3559389, **24, 26 (Ala. App. 2014), petition for certiorari 
docketed by Aubrey Shaw v. Alabama, U.S. Aug. 26, 2016 (holding that there 
was no Doyle violation where prosecutor introduced Shaw’s post-Miranda 
statements that “turn[ed] around all of the questions on the officers” like 
“No need to waste y’all’s time,” “What’s age got to do with it anyway?” and 
“We’re talking” because they rebutted his intoxication defense).    
 But under the court of appeals’ decision, in each of these cases, the 
State would be constitutionally prohibited from presenting the defendant’s 
statements simply because the statements were about the interrogation and 
not about the facts of the case.   This is not what Doyle intended.  See State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App. 1997) (explaining defendant has “‘no 
right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without 
laying himself open to cross-examination upon those facts’”). 
 Indeed, the State is aware of no other jurisdiction that has treated a 
defendant’s statements about his interrogation as the equivalent of silence 
under Doyle or Charles, and the court of appeals cited none.  Rather, many 
-36- 
courts have found no Doyle violation where the prosecutor impeached a 
defendant with statements that were not about his involvement in the 
crime.  See Hunsberger, 565 A.2d at 153-155 (Penn. 1989) (finding no Doyle 
violation where State introduced defendant’s questions, “Are public 
defenders as good as money lawyers?” and “How can I get to see the public 
defender on the sixth floor of the courthouse if I am in jail?”); Lee, 967 A.2d 
at 1164-1166 (holding that there was no Doyle violation where prosecutor 
showed Lee’s police interview of him drunkenly yelling obscenities); Shaw, 
2014 WL 3559389, *24, 26 (holding that there was no Doyle violation where 
prosecutor introduced Shaw’s post-Miranda statements like “No need to 
waste y’all’s time,” “What’s age got to do with it anyway?” and “We’re 
talking”); Boyd, 992 A.2d at 1100 (finding no Doyle violation where Boyd 
told police that he “he was not yet ready to tell the police everything that he 
knew about the murder and that he was not willing to discuss the crime 
scene”); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1412-1413 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding 
no Doyle violation where prosecutor impeached defendant’s trial version 
with his statements to police that he was not guilty, he wanted protective 
custody, and wanted to take a polygraph test).     
 The court of appeals thus erred when it treated Defendant’s 
statements as the “equivalent of silence.”  McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶20.  
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“Because the impeachment evidence here concerned Defendant’s statement   
. . . Doyle’s rule does not apply.” United States v. Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121, 1127 
(9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).  “A contrary rule ‘would pervert the 
constitutional right into a right to falsify free from the embarrassment of 
impeachment evidence from the defendant’s own mouth.’”  Id. at 1128 
(quoting Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975)).  This Court should 
reverse.  
B. Defendant’s statements were not about his interrogation; they 
were about the crime because they amounted to a denial of 
his involvement.  
 Even if the court of appeals’ disparate treatment of statements about  
interrogations versus statements about crimes were supportable, the court 
of appeals also erred when it held that Defendant’s statements were not 
about the crime.  And that error sets precedent for cases where defendants 
make statements similar to Defendant’s. 
 While some of Defendant’s statements bare superficial similarities to 
Doyle’s, Defendant did not merely inquire into what was happening, like 
Doyle did.  Defendant’s statements instead told an exculpatory story that he 
was not involved in the crime:  he had been asleep, he was awakened by the 
police, and he did not know that anyone had been shot. 
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 Context matters.  True, if a defendant had been awakened by police 
days or months after a shooting, such a statement might not be about the 
facts of the crime.  But that is not what happened here.  Police arrived 
almost immediately after Defendant shot John—indeed, Defendant and 
John were still struggling over the gun.  See R.297:30; R.298:50-51.  They 
immediately arrested Defendant and took him to the police station for 
questioning.  See R.298:51-54.  Thus, Defendant’s statements that the police 
had just awakened him and that he wanted to know what was going on 
were necessarily statements about the crime, not the interrogation.  And by 
equating Defendant’s statements to the ones Doyle gave without accounting 
for this context, the court of appeals’ decision will allow defendants to give 
conflicting accounts of their involvement in a crime without letting the jury 
know about the conflict so long as the statements to police bare some 
superficial similarity to Doyle’s.   
 But Doyle and Charles do not give defendants the right to hide post-
Miranda stories to police that contradict the stories they tell at trial.  Quite 
the opposite. And to separate the permitted from the prohibited, the “court 
must look at the particular use to which the disclosure is put, and the 
context of the disclosure.”  State v. Maas, 1999 UT App 325, ¶21, 991 P.2d 
1108.  Indeed, it is “the prosecution’s duty to clear up discrepancies 
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manufactured by the defendant. . . .”  State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 376 (Utah 
1982) (per curiam) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor asked 
defendant whether he told police the story he told at trial after defendant 
testified that he had not had an opportunity to give his version of events).  
“There is nothing irregular about trying to straighten out something out on 
the record, if a prosecutor is confronted with a voluntary statement of an 
accused who has taken the witness stand . . . by asking questions to test the 
credibility of the witness.”  Id. at 375. Because McCallie allows defendants to 
give conflicting accounts without being answerable to explain the 
discrepancies—and improperly skews the truth-finding process by doing 
so—this Court should reverse and make clear that alleged Doyle violations 
must be considered in the context of each case and not a rule that looks only 
to superficial similarities between statements made by different defendants 
in different contexts.   
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
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 Respectfully submitted on January 12, 2017. 
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